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Allen v. Allen-Who's at Fault?
I. CASE FACTS
In December 1986, after eighteen months of courtship, Mr. Allen married
Ms. Neal.' The couple enjoyed a harmonious first year of marriage. When the
two decided to marry, Ms. Neal was a healthy, forty-two-year-old woman with
three grown children. Before the marriage, Ms. Neal had suffered serious
financial difficulties and had declared bankruptcy in 1977. She earned less than
$17,000 in the first year of the marriage. Mr. Allen, on the other hand, was a
highly paid bank executive twenty years Ms. Neal's senior whose gross income
had risen from $288,149 in 1986 to $500,000 in 1991. He knew of his fiance's
financial difficulties when the couple married and realized she had "notes
scattered all over."2
After a year of marriage, the relationship deteriorated. Mrs. Allen fell ill
with a severe and debilitating case of irritable bowel syndrome. She also
suffered from a breast lump, severe reflux esophagitis, and bladder problems.
At the trial, her doctor testified that Mrs. Allen's illness left her unemployable.
Simultaneously, problems developed over Mrs. Allen's spending habits,
particularly concerning expenses for her daughter's wedding. Suspecting
infidelity, Mrs. Allen accused her husband of carrying on extramarital affairs.
Mr. Allen left his wife in 1991 and subsequently filed for divorce based on time
separate and apart under Louisiana Civil Code article 102! The trial court
granted the divorce and Mrs. Allen sought alimony. Mr. Allen defended on the
grounds that Mrs. Allen was legally at fault and thus barred from receiving
alimony under Louisiana Civil Code article 112.4 The trial court accepted his
claim and held that Mrs. Allen was not free from fault and therefore not entitled
to receive alimony in accordance with Article 112. The trial court stated many
reasons to support its decision including Mrs. Allen's conflicts with her husband
over his charitable donations, thousands of dollars of unauthorized credit card
charges against Mr. Allen's account, her criticism of Mr. Allen to his children,
mishandling of financial affairs leading to Mrs. Allen's bankruptcy, her
Copyright 1996, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Allen v. Allen, 648 So. 2d 359 (La. 1994).
2. Id. at 360.
3. La. Civ. Code art. 102 provides in pertinent part:
A divorce shall be granted upon motion of a spouse when either spouse has filed a
petition for divorce and upon proof that one hundred eighty days have elapsed from the
service of the petition, or from the execution of written waiver of the service, and that the
spouses have lived separate and apart continuously for at least one hundred eighty days
prior to the filing of the rule to show cause.
4. La. Civ. Code art. 112(AXI) provides in pertinent part:
When a spouse has not been at fault and has not sufficient means for support, the court
may allow that spouse, out of the property and earnings of the other spouse, permanent
periodic alimony ....
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complaints that Mr. Allen "did not do enough" financially for Mrs. Allen's
children, and her criticism that Mr. Allen bought her a "'factory' car rather than
a new car."
S
The trial court recognized that any of the "actions taken individually would
not constitute 'fault' of a degree to cause the dissolution of the marriage," but
went on to decide that taken as a whole the acts were "of a serious nature and
r[ose] to that level of 'fault' to constitute a contributory cause of the failure of
the marriage."'6 The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that Mrs.
Allen's conduct amounted to legal fault.7 The Louisiana Supreme Court,
however, rejected the trial court's holding, reversed the decision and remanded
the case with the order that Mrs. Allen be awarded alimony.8 Held.: As a
matter of law, Mrs. Allen's conduct did not amount to legal fault under the
current codal provisions and the prior jurisprudence.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAULT IN LOUISIANA
A. Legislative History
Neither Spanish law, the marriage legislation of 1807, the Digest of 1808,
nor the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 contained divorce provisions.9 Under
these regimes, couples could only obtain judgments for separation from bed and
board. The separation legislation followed the principles established in Canon
and Spanish laws and only granted separation for specified causes. These causes
always required a showing that the other spouse's conduct "warranted a
termination of conjugal cohabitation," and only a spouse who was free from fault
5. To support its finding of fault, the court listed the following reasons:
1. Having conflicts with Plaintiff because Plaintiff made donations to non-profit or
charitable groups.
2. Making thousands of dollars of unauthorized credit card charges against Plaintiff's
account.
3. Criticizing Plaintiff to Plaintiff's children.
4. Mishandling financial affai;s, leading to Defendant's personal bankruptcy.
5. Complaining that Plaintiff did not do enough financially for Defendant's children.
6. Complaining that Plaintiff bought Defendant a "factory" car rather than a new car.
7. Categorizing Plaintiff's hometown and home area, to Plaintiff and others, as "the hell
hold (sic] of America."
8. Arguing "back and forth" with Plaintiff, for a long period of time.
Allen, 648 So. 2d at 361.
6. Allen v. Allen, 642 So. 2d 202, 203-04 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
7. Allen, 642 So. 2d at 202.
8. Allen v. Allen, 648 So. 2d 359 (La. 1994). For subsequent history, see Allen v. Allen, 653
So. 2d 169 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
9. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Family Law in Louisiana, Vol. IV 128 (July 1995). Professor
Spaht's work is the basis for the legislative history section of this article. For a complete history,
see Family Law in Louisiana 128-31. See also Christoper L. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law §
4.07 (1993).
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could bring an action for separation. 0 Thus, divorce was impossible in
Louisiana. Separation was allowed, but only for serious violations of marital
duties which were limited to:
adultery, conviction of a felony and sentenced to imprisonment at hard
labor or death; cruel treatment or habitual intemperance which rendered
the common life together insupportable; public defamation; abandon-
ment; attempt against the life of a spouse; charged with a felony and
fled from justice; and intentional non-support of a spouse who is in
destitute or necessitous circumstances."
When separation was allowed, the obligation of support always continued.
The early legislation indicates the strong public policy that marriage was a
lifetime commitment and that spouses always owed one another fidelity, support
and assistance."
In 1803, the legislature began passing special acts allowing particular
couples to divorce, a practice which continued until it was prohibited by an
amendment to the Louisiana Constitution in 1845. New general divorce
legislation was passed in 1827. The 1827 legislation provided that a spouse
who had obtained a separation judgment could obtain a divorce after a specified
time had passed without reconciliation. Until 1898, only the spouse who had
originally obtained the separation judgment (the one not at fault) could petition
for divorce. After 1898, either spouse was allowed to petition for divorce after
two years of separation without reconciliation.
After 1916, Louisiana allowed divorces based solely on time separate and
apart without reconciliation." In such divorce proceedings, a party could
obtain divorce upon a showing that the spouses had lived "separate and apart"
for seven years or more. A showing of fault was not required. Since 1916,
the required time apart has been reduced, and today the law only requires six
months to obtain a divorce not based on fault.'5 Fault, however, has always
been an issue for alimony determinations. Former Louisiana Civil Code
article 160 allowed alimony for wives, and later husbands, who proved both
need and freedom from fault.'6 Fault operated as a bar to a claim for alimo-
10. Spaht. supra note 9, at 128.
11. Spaht, supra note 9, at 335.
12. The marriage continued during the separation, therefore the obligation of support from La.
Civ. Code art. 98 continued.
13. La. Civ. Code art. 98.
14. Spaht, supra note 9, at 130.
15. La. Civ. Code arts. 102 and 103. For Article 102 see supra note 3. Article 103 provides
in part: "A divorce shall be granted on the petition of a spouse upon proof that ... [t]he spouses
have been living separate and apart continuously for a period of six months or more on the date the
petition is filed...."
16. La. Civ. Code art. 160 (1870):
If the wife who has obtained the divorce has not sufficient means for her maintenance,
the Court may allow her in its discretion... alimony... provided, however, that in cases
1996]
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ny. 7 The party seeking alimony bore the burden of proving freedom from fault
in order to receive alimony.' Just as today, if a spouse did not prove she was
free from fault, she was barred forever from recovering alimony. 9
The articles on alimony did not define fault sufficient to bar alimony, so
courts applied by analogy the grounds for fault from the law of divorce and the
law of separation from bed and board. 0 The jurisprudence came to require that
for conduct to bar alimony, it had to be serious misconduct which was also the
proximate cause for separation or divorce."' Repealed Louisiana Civil Code
article 1382 provided the fault grounds for a separation judgment and former
where, under the laws of this State a divorce is granted solely on the ground that the
married persons have been living separate and apart for a certain specified period of time,
and the husband has obtained a divorce upon the ground of such living separate and apart,
and the wife has not been at fault, then the Court may allow the wife.., alimony ....
(emphasis added).
17. La. Civ. Code art. 112 and La. Civ. Code art. 160 (1870). Today's Article 112 provides
in pertinent part: "When a spouse has not been at fault and has not sufficient means for support, the
court may allow that spouse... permanent periodic alimony .... (emphasis added). The Editor's
note explains that "[p]resent Article 112 is Article 160 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, as
amended by Acts 1986, No. 229, § 1. Article 160 has been redesignated as Article 112 by the
Louisiana State Law Institute." For the text of Article 160 (1870), see supra note 16. Fault was not
exactly a defense to the obligation to pay alimony, because the burden of proof was on the claimant
to prove that she was not at fault. This is still true today, except for cases in which the potential
obligor committed adultery. Lagars v. Lagars, 491 So. 2d 5 (La. 1986), See infra part lI.B.3.
18. Christopher L. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law § 15.26 n.212 (1993) (citing Kelly v.
Kelly, 596 So. 2d 286, 292 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 639 (1992), which cited
Vicknair v. Vicknair, 237 La. 1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (La. 1959); McKnight v. Irving, 228 La. 1088,
85 So. 2d I (La. 1956); Sachse v. Sachse, 150 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963) (holding to the
same effect); Green v. Green, 567 So. 2d 139 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990); Smith v. Smith, 216 So. 2d
391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (holding to the same effect); Wheelahan v. Wheelahan, 557 So. 2d 1046
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 1379 (1990); Batiste v. Batiste, 586. So. 2d 643, 645 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1991)). See infra text accompanying notes 54-55 and 64 for a discussion of the burden
of proof.
19. La. Civ. Code art. 112. See supra note 4. Present Article 112 is former Article 160 of the
La. Civ. Code of 1870, as amended in 1986. But see Lagars v. Lagars, 491 So. 2d 5 (La. 1986).
20. See infra discussion in part l1.B for the development of this jurisprudential rule.
21. Felgar v. Doty, 217 La. 365,46 So. 2d 300 (La. 1950). See infra part lI.B for a complete
discussion of the development of this jurisprudential rule.
22. Former Civil Code art. 138 provided the following grounds for separation from bed and board:
Separation from bed and board may be claimed reciprocally for the following causes:
1. In case of adultery on the part of the other spouse;
2. When the other spouse has been condemned to an infamous punishment;
3. On account of habitual intemperance of one of the married persons, or excesses, cruel
treatment, or outrages of one of them toward the other, if such habitual intemperance, or
such ill-treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable;
4. Of a public defamation on the part of one of the married persons towards the other;
5. Of the abandonment of the husband by his wife or the wife by her husband;
6. Of an attempt of one of the married persons against the life of the other;
7. When the husband or wife has been charged with an infamous offense, and shall
actually have fled from justice, the wife or husband of such fugitive may claim a
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Louisiana Civil Code article 13923 provided fault grounds for divorce. The
jurisprudence came to adopt these fault grounds as the only bars to alimony.
Thus, the former legislation and the judicial interpretation suggested a strong
policy in favor of awarding support to needy spouses unless the spouse
committed serious misconduct of the kind which would be grounds for separation
or divorce.
Effective in 1991, the Louisiana legislature repealed the articles on
separation of bed and board.2 ' In doing so, it abrogated Article 138 and
removed part of the legislative basis for fault upon which the courts had relied
to determine fault in an alimony proceeding. All proximate causes for separation
were repealed. Without Article 138's definition of fault for separation, the only
legislation left to provide specific grounds for fault which barred alimony was
Louisiana Civil Code article 103. Article 103 names three grounds for divorce:
(1) living separate and apart for six months; (2) adultery; and (3) commission of
a felony and sentencing to death or imprisonment at hard labor.25 Two of these
grounds, adultery and commission of a felony, are fault-based. In abrogating the
separation articles, the legislature did not modify the alimony articles or specify
if it intended to remove the Article 138 bars to recovery of alimony. Thus,
today, there are no proximate causes for separation and only two proximate
causes for divorce-adultery and commission of a felony with sentencing.
B. The Jurisprudential History
1. Early Determinations of Fault in Separation Judgments
Early decisions on fault for separation judgments used a method of analysis
called "comparative rectitude" to determine fault. First, the court considered
whether the conduct of the defending spouse fell under one of the faults named
in Article 138. Next, the court looked at the conduct of the plaintiff to determine
separation from bed and board, on producing proofs to the judge before whom the action
for separation is brought, that such husband or wife has actually been guilty of such
infamous offense, and has fled from justice;
8. On account of the intentional non-support by the husband of his wife who is in
destitute or necessitous circumstances.[sic]
La. Civ. Code art. 138 (1870).
23. Former Article 139 provided grounds for divorce:
Immediate divorce may be claimed receprocably [reciprocally] for one of the following
causes:
1. Adultery on the part of the other spouse.
2. Conviction of the other spouse and his sentence to death or imprisonment at hard
labor.
Divorce may be granted to either spouse after a separation from bed and board..
La. Civ. Code art. 139 (1870).
24. Articles 138 through 145 were repealed by 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, effective January 1,
1991.
25. La. Civ. Code art. 103.
1996]
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if she was free from fault. If so, the court granted the separation judgment. If
not, the court compared the conduct of both spouses to determine if one party
was substantially more to blame for the deterioration of the marital relationship.
If the petitioning party proved the other spouse was substantially more to blame,
the court would allow the couple to separate legally. Otherwise, the court
refused to grant a fault-based separation.26
In the 1926 Louisiana Supreme Court decision Gormley v. Gormley," the
court laid out this method of analyzing fault in a separation action. Mrs.
Gormley sought a separation judgment and alleged that her husband was guilty
of habitual intemperance and cruel treatment, fault grounds for separation under
Article 138. Mr. Gormley answered that Mrs. Gormley, too, was guilty of
cruelty. First, the court defined cruelty which amounted to fault as "excesses,
outrages, and cruel treatment"28 and explicitly rejected "disappointment in the
marriage relation and mere incompatibility of temper"29 as sufficient grounds
to grant a separation judgment. Next, the court required that "the complainant
must be comparatively free from wrong"3 in order to be awarded the separation
judgment. The court reviewed Mrs. Gormley's testimony and found it "very
vague and most unsatisfactory."'" The court recognized that Mrs. Gormley
proved the parties "quarrelled [sic] and abused each other a good deal"; however,
the court went on to say that "it [was] not so clear who was to blame." '3 The
court went through three inquiries in this case. First, the court determined
whether the husband was guilty of excesses, outrage, or cruel treatment based on
the grounds listed in Article 138. Then, the court looked to see whether the wife
substantially contributed to the marital discord or whether she was herself guilty
of such conduct. Finally,.the court considered whether one party was clearly
more blameworthy than the other. In Gormley, the court held that neither party
proved the other guilty of cruel treatment and thus refused to grant the separation
judgment.
The 1929 supreme court in McKoin v. McKoin13 refused to grant a
separation judgment because "the spouses [were] chargeable with mutual
misconduct towards each other which, because of the defendant's unfortunate
physical condition, [was] so nearly proportional that [the court could not]
determine which of the parties [was] at greatest fault."34 Mr. McKoin peti-
tioned for separation on the grounds that Mrs. McKoin abandoned him to live
26. Separation based on time separate and apart was available after 1956. La. Civ. Code at.
138 (1870). Divorce based on time separate and apart was available after 1919. Spaht, supra note
9, at 130.
27. 161 La. 121, 108 So. 307 (La. 1926).
28. Id. at 123, 108 So. at 308.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 168 La. 32, 121 So. 182 (La. 1929).
34. Id. at 35, 121 So. at 182.
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with her mother, abused morphine, defamed him by telling his father she
suspected he was having an affair, and cursed him in public. Mrs. McKoin
responded that her ill health and the plaintiff s cruel treatment forced her to leave
the matrimonial domicile and seek shelter at her mother's home. Mrs. McKoin
also alleged that she was not addicted to morphine and had used it only under
her doctor's supervision following two serious operations. The court rejected
Mr. McKoin's allegations of defamation because the defendant's statement to
plaintiff's father was not public criticism and the alleged cursing was not of a
serious nature. The court found no evidence to corroborate either party's
allegations of mistreatment at the hands of the other and no evidence to show
which party was more at fault. In this situation, the supreme court held that "the
courts will not grant relief to either."3
Although the court did not reiterate the Gormley test of first determining if
the defendant's conduct amounted to legal fault and then looking for mutual
misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, the court applied that exact analysis. The
type of conduct the court considered in determining legal fault was abandonment,
physical abuse, cruelty, and defamation. The court first looked to the conduct
of the defendant and then to the conduct of the plaintiff. Finally, the court
looked for mutual fault which would bar either party from obtaining a separation
judgment.
In Abele v. Barker,36 a 1942 decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court again
considered whether a spouse proved fault such that she was; entitled to a
separation judgment. Mrs. Abele sued for a separation judgment and alleged that
her husband, Mr. Barker, was guilty of "such excesses, outrages, and cruelty
toward her as to render their living together insupportable."3' Mrs. Abele
claimed that her husband severely beat her during six years of the marriage, left
home for a week without providing her any funds to support the family,
threatened to kill her, cursed her in front of their children, did not provide her
with sufficient funds to support the family, and refused to provide her with
necessary surgical treatment. In response, Mr. Barker alleged that his wife
neglected him, neglected the children, and associated socially with another man.
The court found that Mrs. Abele failed to prove the abuses she alleged. She
could offer no corroborating evidence since the alleged incidents all occurred in
the home. The court offered several additional reasons for rejecting Mrs.
Abele's testimony even though Mr. Barker admitted striking his wife in the past.
First, the court noted that Mrs. Abele continued to live with her husband despite
the alleged violence and found it "not likely that she would have continued to
live with him as she did" if her allegations were true.3" Second, the court
35. Id.
36. 200 La. 125, 7 So. 2d 684 (La. 1942).
37. Id. at 127, 7 So. 2d at 684.
38. Id. at 132, 7 So. 2d at 686. The court explained the interpretation of the situation this way:
If the wife's version is accepted, it was serious. However, the fact that the wife continued
to live with her husband without complaint for more than four years after this incident
19961
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found that "she seem[ed] to have condoned the offense."39 The court pointed
out that the wife had slapped her husband for calling her a vile name and
provoked him by being argumentative. The court rested on the comparative
rectitude notion that even if Mr. Barker's conduct amounted to fault, Mrs.
Abele's conduct also amounted to cruelty since the court determined that she
provoked his behavior. Therefore, she was as much at fault as he was.
The court went on to find that even if both parties were at fault, Mrs. Abele
herself was more guilty of fault for publicly and habitually associating with
another man.' Mr. Barker proved that Mrs. Abele went to shows and to the
beach with him, rode in his car at night, and generally caused gossip about the
family. For these offenses, the court granted Mr. Barker a separation judgment
and granted him custody of their minor children. The court opined:
If there was nothing involved in this controversy between husband and
wife except the brawls and encounters disclosed by the record, it might
be said that each of the parties was at fault and that their wrongs were
mutual. However, due to the wife's conduct aside from these alterca-
tions, her faults decidedly outweigh the faults of her husband .... Her
conduct was inexcusable. It was such as to cause her husband to feel
41embarrassed and humiliated. He had a right to protest ....
The Abele court carried the Gormley test to its extreme. The court
considered the conduct of each party as it if it amounted to fault and went on to
determine that even if the conduct of both parties amounted to legal fault, Mrs.
Abele's conduct was so much worse that her actions entitled Mr. Barker to a
separation judgment. By granting the judgment to Mr. Barker, this decision
effectively barred Mrs. Abele from ever receiving alimony.
These early determinations of fault for separation required the plaintiff to
show serious misconduct by the defendant spouse before the court would grant
a separation judgment. Old Article 139 provided two automatic grounds for a
separation, adultery and conviction of a felony with sentencing to death or
imprisonment at hard labor.42 Absent that, only old Article 138-type conduct
such as excesses, outrages, abandonment, and cruel treatment which made the
marital relationship insupportable would be sufficient to obtain a separation
indicatesi that the husband's version of it is probably correct, and that, even if she thought
he was guilty of misconduct toward her, she condoned the offense. If he had so violently
attacked her and had administered a severe blow, by which she was severely wounded,
as she says she was, it its not likely that she would have continued to live with him as she
did.
Id. at 131-32, 7 So. 2d at 686.
39. Id. at 133, 7 So. 2d at 686.
40. Id. at 130, 7 So. 2d at 685. Mr. Barker did not allege that his wife had committed adultery,
only that her friendship with another man was inappropriate.
41. Id. at 135-36, 7 So. 2d at 687.
42. La. Civ. Code art. 139 (1870). See supra note 23.
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judgment. Once a spouse proved the other guilty of such treatment, she had to
defend the almost certain allegations of mutual fault. If she was able to meet
that burden, then she would be entitled to a separation judgment. When a spouse
failed to prove freedom from fault, the court compared each spouse's behavior.
This analysis was called comparative rectitude. If the parties were guilty of the
same types of Article 138 offenses, the court would deny the separation
judgment unless one spouse could show the other's conduct was substantially
worse. In that case, the court would grant the judgment in favcr of the more
innocent spouse.
A close look at these early cases reveals the policy concerns the courts had
in granting separation judgments. The overriding policy was to maintain
marriages unless one party had seriously violated the marital duties. If both were
equally guilty of misconduct, the courts refused to dissolve the marriage. This
also, obviously, continued the support obligation. The policy behind comparative
rectitude was to avoid unleashing the parties on the world. These cases,
however, clearly upheld the overriding policy that it was in the best interest of
the state that couples remain married.
2. Development of Fault Which Barred Alimony Under Article 160
Former Louisiana Civil Code article 160 required that a wife petitioning for
alimony be free from fault. 3 The Civil Code, however, did not define fault for
this purpose. Thus, before the repeal of the articles on separation of bed and
board, the courts analogized fault which barred alimony to fault which caused a
separation or divorce under former Articles 138 and 139. In Felger v. Doty,"
the Louisiana Supreme Court defined fault contemplated by old Article 160 as
"conduct or substantial acts of commission or omission on the part of the wife,
violative of her marital duties and responsibilities, which constitute a contributing
or a proximate cause of the separation and continuous living apart, the ground
for the divorce."5 To amount to fault and bar alimony the conduct had to be
both a very serious violation of marital duties and legal grounds for separation
or divorce. The third circuit, in Smith v. Smith, described the essence of the
Felger definition of fault to be "conduct which constitutes grounds for separation
or divorce, other than mere living separate and apart for a specified period of
time." Under this definition, to be fault, the conduct had to be conduct which
could lead proximately to the judicial dissolution of the marriage. These cases
demonstrate the policy that a wife should not be denied alimony except for a
grave violation of her marital duties-one which would entitle her husband to a
separation or divorce.
43. Former Article 160 is present La. Civ. Code art. 112. See supra note 4.
44. 217 La. 365, 46 So. 2d 300 (La. 1950).
45. Id. at 369, 46 So. 2d at 301 (emphasis added).
46. Smith v. Smith, 216 So. 2d 391, 394 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
1996]
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In Vicknair v. Johnson, 7 the Louisiana Supreme Court considered what
level of conduct would bar a wife from receiving alimony. The court refused to
find Mrs. Vicknair at fault even though she cursed her husband, accused him of
infidelity, telephoned him constantly at work, nagged him incessantly, threatened
his life, and allowed another woman to sleep with her and her husband in their
bed. The court stated that the misconduct was not of "such a serious nature as
to constitute fault within the meaning of the statute,""8 and held that Mrs.
Vicknair's conduct did not amount to legal fault. The court used the definition
of fault set out in Felger and found that Mrs. Vicknair's conduct did not rise to
the level of cruelty and therefore was not legal fault.49 On the issue of the
burden of proof, the Vicknair court held that in an alimony proceeding, following
a divorce granted on the basis of living separate and apart, the wife petitioning
for alimony bore the burden of proving she was free from fault."0
In Kendrick v. Duconge,51 the supreme court recognized a defense to
conduct that would otherwise be fault. The court acknowledged that sometimes
a wife could be justified in violating her marital duties. Mrs. Kendrick broke off
marital relations with her husband because she believed that he was committing
adultery. Mrs. Kendrick first moved into her own room; she later left the marital
domicile and took her own apartment. While the court admitted that ordinarily
such conduct would amount to fault, the Kendrick court stated that to be at fault
the conduct had to be more "than a justifiable or natural response to initial fault
on the part of the husband." 2  The Kendrick court held that "[w]here the
husband's fault provoke[d] the wife into terminating the marital relationship, she
[was] considered to be herself free from fault ....
To qualify for alimony under old Article 160, the court required the petitioning
spouse to prove she was free from fault as defined under former Articles 138 and
139. s' Merely some contribution to the dissolution of the marriage was not
enough to constitute fault and bar alimony." Vicknair and Kendrick illustrate that
47. 237 La. 1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (La. 1959).
48. Id. at 1037, 112 So. 2d at 703.
49. Id. at 1037 n.1, 112 So. 2d at 703 n.I.
50. Id. at 1035, 112 So. 2d at 703. The court stated:
[1]f the husband has obtained a divorce solely on the ground that the panics have been
living separate and apart for a certain specified period of time, and the wife has not been
at fault, she may claim this pension .... In applying this Article (Old Article 160] in
cases like this, the court has held that the wife carries the burden of establishing that she
was without fault and also that she is in necessitous circumstances.
Id. Also, at this time only wives were entitled to alimony. See La. Civ. Code an. 160 (1870).
Article 160 was amended by Act 72 of 1979 to provide alimony to husbands as well.
51. 236 La. 34, 106 So. 2d 707 (La. 1958).
52. Id. at 39, 106 So. 2d at 709.
53. Id. at 38, 106 So. 2d at 708.
54. When La. Civ. Code art. 160 was drafted, only wives were allowed alimony. Act 72 of
1979 amended Article 160 to allow alimony to either spouse.
55. Pearce v. Pearce, 348 So. 2d 75, 77 (La. 1977) (holding that "[a] wife is not deprived of
alimony after divorce simply because she was not totally blameless in the marital discord," citing
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only grievous misconduct amounted to cruelty, one of the Article 138 faults, and
barred alimony. Because the supreme court chose to limit fault barring alimony,
these cases indicate a public policy in favor of granting alimony.
3. Recent Jurisprudence Analogizing Fault Under Former Article 160 to
Fault Under Old Article 138
Three later Louisiana Supreme Court decisions refined the definition of fault
which barred alimony under former Article 160.56 In Adams v. Adams,57 the
supreme court reaffirmed their definition of fault from Pearce v. Pearce,58 and
accepted this definition of fault:
"Fault" contemplates conduct or substantial acts of commission or
omission by the wife violative of her marital duties and responsibilities.
A wife is not deprived of alimony.., simply because she was not totally
blameless in marital discord .... To constitute fault, a wife's misconduct
must not only be of a serious nature but must also be an independent
contributory or proximate cause of the separation. 59
The Adams court went on to hold that "[a]lthough not specifically mentioning C.C.
art. 138(l)-(8), or C.C. art. 139 by name, this language clearly indicates that only
such conduct as will entitle one spouse to a separation or divorce under these
articles is sufficient to deprive the other spouse of alimony after a final divorce."'
For the first time, the court specifically held that the only conduct which barred
alimony under former Article 160 was fault as defined in repealed Articles 138 and
139. Once the Adams court made this determination, the court defined the analysis
for finding fault which barred alimony. Under the court's test, to bar alimony upon
divorce after a judgment of separation, "it need only be decided whether plaintiff s
actions would have been sufficient to allow defendant to obtain a judgment against
plaintiff under C.C. art. 138."6I
Vicknair v. Johnson, 237 La. 1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (La. 1959); Davieson v. Trapp, 223 La. 776, 66
So. 2d 804 (La. 1953); Breffeilh v. Breffeilh, 221 La. 843, 60 So. 2d 457 (La. 1952); Adler v. Adler,
239 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970)). Further, Pearce held that "[t]o constitute fault, a wife's
misconduct must not only be of a serious nature but must also be an independent contributory or
proximate cause of the separation." Id. (citing Kendrick v. Duconge, 236 La. 34, 106 So. 2d 707
(La. 1958)).
56. For the pertinent part of old Article 160, see supra note 16. For the pertinent part of
repealed Article 138, see supra note 22.
57. 389 So. 2d 381 (La. 1980).
58. 348 So. 2d 75, 77 (La. 1977).
59. Adams, 389 So. 2d at 383 (citing Pearce v. Pearce, 348 So. 2d 75, 77 (La. 1977); Vicknair
v. Johnson, 237 La. 1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (La. 1959); Kendrick v. Duconge, 236 La. 34, 106 So. 2d
707 (La. 1958); Davieson v. Trapp, 223 La. 776, 66 So. 2d 804 (La. 1953); Breffeilh v. Breffeilh,
221 La. 843, 60 So. 2d 457 (La. 1952); Adler v. Adler, 239 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970)).
60. Adams, 389 So. 2d at 383.
61. Id. The court began: "Having determined that 'fault' for purposes of permanent alimony
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In Lagars v. Lagars,62 the Louisiana Supreme Court extended that same.
reasoning to an alimony proceeding following a divorce granted on the basis of
adultery rather than one following a separation judgment. The court in Lagars
again specifically limited fault which barred alimony to "[o]nly such conduct as
will entitle one spouse to a separation or divorce under La. Civ. Code arts.
138(l)-(8) or 139."63  The court's ultimate test was whether or not the
misconduct would be sufficient to award a separation judgment or a divorce. In
addition, the court held that since Mrs. Lagars proved her husband committed
adultery and obtained the divorce on that ground, rather than pursuant to a
separation judgment based on time separate and apart, the burden shifted to Mr.
Lagars to prove his wife was at fault." By shifting the burden of proof, the
court made it easier for Mrs. Lagars, and future plaintiffs in similar cases, to
receive alimony: she no longer needed to prove herself free from fault. This
change again illustrated the court's policy of favoring alimony awards.
Recently, in the 1991 supreme court decision Brewer v. Brewer,"5 the court
again defined fault sufficient to bar alimony as being limited to fault under old
Articles 138 and 139. The Allen court relied on Brewer when it characterized
fault as: (1) adultery; (2) habitual intemperance, excesses, cruel treatment or
outrages, making living together insupportable; and (3) abandonment."
The general premises laid out in Adams, Lagars, and Brewer form the basis
for determining fault which bars alimony as analyzed under old Articles 138 and
139. These cases established the analysis used to determine fault which bars
alimony. Only fault which was an independent contributory or proximate cause
of separation or divorce would bar alimony, and only acts rising to level of
misconduct under old Articles 138 or 139 met that definition. In addition, the
courts emphasized that a spouse could be awarded alimony even when not totally
blameless. Finally, in Lagars, the court held that when a divorce was granted
based on adultery, the defending spouse bore the burden of proving the fault of
the petitioning spouse. Again, these decisions suggested a policy in favor of
granting support, absent the most serious misconduct. Lagars furthered this
policy by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant when the defendant had
been found guilty of adultery. Thus, the Adams, Lagars, and Brewer decisions
set the standard by which the fault of the spouse petitioning for alimony was to
be judged.
preclusion is synonymous with the fault grounds for separation and divorce, it need only be
decided .... " Id.
62. 491 So. 2d 5 (La. 1986).
63. Id. at 7 (citing Adams v. Adams, 389 So. 2d 381 (La. 1980)).
64. Lagars, 491 So. 2d at 5.
65. 573 So. 2d 467 (La.. 1991).
66. Allen v. Allen, 648 So. 2d 359, 362 (La. 1994); see also Brewer v. Brewer, 573 So. 2d 467
(La. 1991).
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III. THE LouiSIANA SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS IN ALLEN v. ALLEN
A. The Majority Opinion
In Allen v. Allen,67 the issue of legal fault barring alimony since the repeal
of Article 138 came to the supreme court for the first time. The court rejected
the lower courts' determination of fault, applied its own analysis, and found Mrs.
Allen to be free from legal fault. Remanding the case, the court ordered that
alimony be awarded.
The supreme court began its analysis of whether Mrs. Allen was at fault by
considering the only remaining statutory fault grounds for divorce-adultery or
conviction of a felony and a sentence to death or imprisonment at hard labor.
Current Louisiana Civil Code article 103, in subparagraphs (2) and (3), includes
these grounds which were previously in old Article 139.68 Neither party alleged
such conduct. The court noted that whereas Mrs. Allen had not committed acts
which directly and explicitly fit the current statutory definitions of fault, the
"statutory law does not specify fault which would deny permanent alimony." '69
The only statutory fault grounds are in Article 103, a divorce article. No
alimony article defines fault.70 Therefore, legal fault, explained the court, "must
be determined according to the prior jurisprudential criteria."'" In so stating,
the court revived legal fault as determined under the jurisprudence prior to the
abrogation of Article 138. To support the decision to revive what has been
dubbed "Phantom Article 138,"' the majority reasoned that, in the past, bills
to eliminate fault as a bar to alimony had failed." In addition, the court noted
67. 648 So. 2d 359 (La. 1994).
68. La. Civ. Code art. 103 provides:
A divorce shall be granted on the petition of a spouse upon proof that:
(1) The spouses have been living separate and apart continuously for a period of six
.months or more on the date the petition is filed; or
(2) The other spouse has committed adultery; or
(3) The other spouse has committed a felony and has been sentenced to death or
imprisonment at hard labor.
Revision comment (b) notes that "[s]ubparagraphs (2) and (3) of this Article reproduce the first two
grounds for immediate divorce contained in former La. Civ. Code article 139 (1870) without
substantive change." La. Civ. Code art. 103.
69. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 362.
70. The alimony provisions have never defined fault. The courts historically have looked to
the definition of fault found in the separation and divorce provisions-former Articles 138 and 139.
After the repeal of the separation articles, the only remaining faults are found in Article 103. Mrs.
Allen had committed neither adultery nor a felony and therefore had not committed a fault under the
statutory provisions. Rather than end the inquiry there, the court went on to consider fault as defined
in the prior jurisprudence. See supra part II.A.
71. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 362.
72. Blakesley, supra note 18, at 15-43, § 15.27.
73. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 362 n.2. Footnote 2 noted that "[b]ills to eliminate fault as an alimony
barrier have failed in the Louisiana legislature. See for example, La. H.B. 901, 5th Reg. Sess. (1979),
and La. S.B. 268 & 682, 7th Reg. Sess. (1981)."
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that efforts to eliminate non-adulterous fault as a bar to alimony had been
unsuccessful as well.74
The majority opinion cited Lagars v. Lagars" as the primary source for
analyzing legal fault under the old jurisprudence.76 The Lagars decision applied
the definition of fault from Vicknair v. Vicknair" and Pearce v. Pearce.7, The
court in Lagars reaffirmed the holding in Adams that the Pearce and Vicknair
definition of conduct which barred alimony was only misconduct as contemplated
under old Articles 138 and 139.79 In other words, a spouse was only barred
from alimony if his conduct amounted to legal fault under either of those articles
and his conduct could have been a cause for dissolution or separation. Using
these cases as support, the Allen court stated the definition this way: "[I]egal
fault consists of serious misconduct, which is a cause of the marriage's dissolu-
tion. '
In defining serious misconduct, the majority opinion never explicitly limited
such conduct to that which was contemplated under repealed Article 138. The
omission of this determination is confusing, and some of the language in the
opinion could be interpreted to allow non-Article 138 conduct to bar alimony.'
This danger probably led Justice Kimball to write a separate concurrence."2
However, by citing Lagars as the primary source for its analysis of fault, the
court implicitly endorsed the limits set by that case, which held that serious
misconduct was limited to the faults named in repealed Article 138. Under the
Article 138 standard, the court concluded that Mrs. Allen's actions did not
amount to the serious misconduct contemplated in the article." Although the
court did not specify that it analyzed her actions to determine whether or not
they amounted to cruelty, an Article 138 ground for separation, the cited cases
indicate cruelty was at issue. Relying on Abele v. Barker" and Brewer v.
Brewer,85 the court found that a "quarrelsome or hostile" attitude was a
"reasonable reaction" to legitimate suspicions of infidelity and that reasonable
74. Id. at 363 n.3. (stating that "[b]ills have been introduced in the Louisiana legislature to
eliminate non-adulterous fault as a barrier to permanent alimony. See, for example, La. H.R. 364,
8th Reg. Sess. (1982), and proposed La. Civ. Code art. 161; La. S.B. 311, 8th Reg. Sess. (1982).
The legislation failed to pass.').
75. 491 So. 2d 5 (La. 1986).
76. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 363 ('[L]egal fault must be determined according to the prior
jurisprudential criteria. See Lagars v. Lagers... for an analysis of those criteria." Id.).
77. 237 La. 1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (1959).
78. 348 So. 2d 75 (La. 1977).
79. 491 So. 2d at 5. For a complete discussion of the Lagars analysis, see supra notes 61-63
and the accompanying text.
80. Allen v. Allen, 648 So. 2d 359, 362 (La. 1994).
81. For a complete discussion, see infra parts iJ.B, IV.B, and V.E.
82. See supra part II.B.
83. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 363. "The trial court and court of appeal erred as a matter of law in
finding Mildred Allen guilty of legal fault which caused the dissolution of the marriage." Id.
84. 200 La. 125, 7 So. 2d 684 (La. 1942).
85. 573 So. 2d 467 (La. 1991).
[Vol. 57
NOTES
reactions did not amount to fault." Following Gormley v. Gormley, 7 the
court found that "petty quarrels between husband and wife do not rise to the
level of legal fault.""8 Under these principles, the court determined that the
couple's problems amounted only to petty quarrels, not cruelty. In addition the
court gave Mrs. Allen special consideration in light of her illness, which,
according to the court, understandably would make her more disagreeable.8 9
The court suggested that financial irresponsibility might amount to legal fault
in some cases. Nevertheless, the court found that because Mrs. Allen's
expenditures were not excessive in light of Mr. Allen's income and because Mr.
Allen knew of his wife's spending habits and debts before he married her, Mrs.
Allen's spending did not rise to the level of legal fault. The majority determined
her spending did not amount to cruelty." Additionally, according to the court,
Mrs. Allen's criticisms, complaints, and nagging did not constitute conduct
sufficient to find legal fault. Again, the court found no cruelty. Relying on
Brewer, Pearce, and Vicknair, the court opined that Mrs. Allen's imperfections
were isolated incidents which did not make her guilty of "'cruel treatment or
excesses which [would] compel a separation because the marriage [was]
insupportable.""' Thus, the supreme court held that, based on the prior
jurisprudence, none of Mrs. Allen's imperfections amounted to conduct sufficient
to preclude alimony.
B. Justice Kimball's Concurrence
Justice Kimball concurred in the judgment in Allen v. Allen, accepting the
majority's overall reasoning but clarifying several points. Justice Kimball agreed
with the majority that a proper inquiry into legal fault required an analysis of both
statutory and jurisprudential definitions of legal fault. However, she specified that
fault grounds for post divorce alimony were synonymous with the fault grounds
from the former law of separation and divorce.92 By making this distinction,
Justice Kimball clarified that she would maintain old Article 138's fault grounds
and thejurisprudence interpreting the article as the standard for serious misconduct.
Justice Kimball defined fault as the supreme court had in Pearce: "'fault'
contemplates conduct or substantial acts of commission or omission by the wife
violative of her marital duties and responsibilities,' 3 and her concurring opinion
86. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 362.
87. 161 La. 121, 108 So. 307 (La. 1926).
88. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 362.
89. Id. (following McKoin v. McKoin, 168 La. 32, 121 So. 182. (La. 1929)).
90. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 363.
91. Id. (quoting Brewer v. Brewer, 573 So. 2d 467, 469 (La. 1991), which cited Pearce v.
Pearce, 348 So. 2d 75 (La. 1977), and Vicknair v. Vicknair 237 La. 1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (La.
1959)).
92. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 365.
93. Id. at 364.
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expressly quoted the passage in Adams which held that the language in Pearce was
synonymous with the fault grounds for separation and divorce."
On the issue of causation, Justice Kimball quoted the Kendrick court's
complete definition of fault. "'To constitute fault, a wife's misconduct must not
only be of a serious nature but must also be an independent contributory or
proximate cause of the separation."' 95  However, she did not consider the
argument that abrogation of the causes for separation left no faults to bar alimony,
as those faults could no longer cause dissolution of a marriage.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF ALLEN ON THE LAW
A. The Policy Behind Allen
While ambiguous, the policy suggested by the Allen decision both breaks with
and follows past policy on alimony.9 The decision continues the policy that a
serious violation of one's marital duties precludes an award of alimony. On the
other hand, past courts required that the fault barring alimony be that conduct which
would be grounds for divorce while the Allen court did not. In addition, past
decisions suggest a policy in favor of granting alimony to necessitous spouses when
possible. The recent Louisiana Supreme Court opinion in McAlpine v. McAlpine
insisted on the continued importance of alimony to prevent needy spouses from
relying upon state sponsored support.97 Yet, the Allen court embraced an analysis
limiting the number of alimony awards.
B. Resurrection of Old Article 138 as the Standard for Serious Misconduct
The court in Allen certainly resurrected old Article 138(l)-(8) as providing the
definition of misconduct which may amount to legal fault to preclude alimony.
Ambiguity in the analysis, however, raises the problem ofwhether other fault might
also bar alimony. The court implicitly rejected the idea that the legislative repeal
of Article 138 changed the law of fault which barred alimony.9 Even though the
repealed Article 138 bases for determining fault are no longer in the Civil Code, the
court chose to revive Article 138 as fault to bar alimony by requiring that legal fault
94. Id. at 365.
95. Id. (citing Pearce v. Pearce, 348 So. 2d 75, 77 (La. 1977)) (emphasis added).
96. For a thorough analysis of the policies behind alimony, see Christopher L. Blakesley,
Louisiana Family Law §15.03 (1993).
97. McAlpine v. McAlpine, 650 So. 2d 1142 (La. 1995), withdrawn and reh "g granted.
Obviously, the public has a strong interest in seeing that persons in need of support are
supported; for otherwise the burden falls upon the public at large through social programs
supported by taxpayers. Alimony is on of the ways that the legislature has selected to
distribute the societal obligation to support those in need.
See also Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978) (discussing similar policies concerning
alimony pendente lite).
98. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 362.
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be determined as it was under the prior jurisprudence-jurisprudence which relied
on repealed Article 138. The majority reasoned that "[s]ince the statutory law does
not specify fault which would deny permanent alimony, legal fault must be
determined according to the prior jurisprudential criteria."" The court recognized
that the prior jurisprudence required a two part analysis-first, whether the spouse's
conduct amounted to a serious violation of the marital duties and, second, whether
the serious misconduct was a cause of the dissolution of the marriage. While the
court did not expressly limit the violations to the conduct contemplated under old
Articles 138 and 139, the sources it cited suggest strongly that was the intent.'0°
Thus, Allen probably did not change the type of conduct which amounts to a serious
violation of the marital duties.
C. The Causation Requirement Under Allen
The supreme court opinions in Felger, icknair, Pearce, Kendrick, Lagars, and
Adams'0' all include a causation element in determining fault. The Felger,
Vicknair, Pearce, Kendrick, and Lagars opinions make it clear that "cause" meant
the legal, proximate cause for the dissolution, i.e. conduct which would be grounds
for separation or divorce. However, the Allen decision suggests a different
understanding of causation. "Cause" appears to mean that the misconduct was the
reason the marital relationship fell apart. In other words, "cause of the dissolution"
refers to the personal reason the spouse decided to end the marriage rather than the
judicial basis for granting the divorce. Logically, it seems that theAllen court could
only have interpreted causation to be the personal reason the spouse left the
marriage, since, after the 1990 revisions, old Article 138 conduct can no longer be
the judicial cause of a divorce." 2 On the other hand, the court's use of Lagars,
Pearce, and Vicknair as authority seems to belie this logic. The language of the
majority suggests a change, but the cited authority does not.
The Lagars definition of fault required that the misconduct be an independent
contributory or proximate cause of separation or dissolution of the marriage." 3
Lagars was decided under the pre- 1991 revisions when separation of bed and board
was still in the Civil Code. Therefore, Article 138 conduct could cause a separation
and, eventually, a divorce. One way of applying the Lagars analysis would lead to
the conclusion that since former Articles 138 and 139 were the only bases for fault
99. Id.
100. Id. at 363. The majority named Lagars as containing the criteria for determining legal fault.
The Lagars court followed Adams and expressly limited serious misconduct to the conduct defined
in Old Article 138(l)-(8). For a more complete analysis of Lagars see supra notes 61-63 and the
accompanying text.
101. Lagars v. Lagars, 491 So. 2d 5 (La. 1986), Pearce v. Pearce, 348 So. 2d 75 (La. 1977),
Vicknair v. Johnson, 237 La. 1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (La. 1959), Kendrick v. Duconge, 236 La. 34,
106 So. 2d 707 (La. 1958), and Felger v. Doty, 217 La. 365, 46 So. 2d 300 (La. 1950).
102. See supra part ll.B.3.
103. Lagars, 491 So. 2d at 5.
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which would cause a separation or divorce, when the legislature repealed Article
138 and redesignated Article 139 as Article 103, the only remaining grounds for
fault that could cause the judicial dissolution of the marriage were the two now
found in Article 103-adultery and commission of a felony with sentencing. Thus,
old Article 138 conduct could no longer bar alimony because it can no longer be the
legal, proximate cause of separation or divorce, as was required by the Felger,
Vicknair, Pearce, and Lagars definition of fault.
The Allen decision, therefore, may represent a substantial change in the
definition of alimony-barring fault. The decision may require that the party prove
that the misconduct caused him to leave the marriage and seek a divorce. If a
showing that the conduct was the personal reason for the termination of the
marriage is the requirement under Allen, the unanswered question of what level of
causation must a party prove remains.
The Allen opinion mentioned causation only once when it stated that the
alleged fault must be "a cause of the marriage's dissolution,""' citing the earlier
decisions of Vicknair and Pearce. This description of causation is not the same
standard the court applied in Vicknair, Pearce, or Lagars. In Lagars, the supreme
court held that the fault must "'be an independent contributory or proximate cause
of the separation'" °I-othe same standard articulated in Vicknair and Pearce.
Setting aside the argument that those decisions contemplated something other than
the personal reason that the spouse sought a divorce, the definition of causation in
the Allen decision and that in the Lagars decision suggest different levels of
causation. Allen required that the misconduct only be "a cause of the marriage's
dissolution"'" while Lagars referred to the proximate cause. The two standards
may be different.
The pre-Allen decisions included the causation requirement to limit conduct
which barred alimony and to increase alimony awards. However, under Allen, if
the fault need only be "a cause," the court may have increased the chances of a
petitioning spouse's being denied alimony. The petitioning spouse would have to
prove the misconduct and that the misconduct was a cause of his decision to leave
the marriage. Before, only the conduct had to be proven.
An inquiry into the personal reasons for ending the marriage would be new to
the courts. Under the priorjurisprudence, "it need[ed] only [to] be decided whether
plaintiff's actions would have been sufficient to allow defendant to obtain a
judgment against plaintiff under C.C. art. 138."' ° A determination of the party's
state of mind and personal reasons for leaving was not required. Perhaps now
104. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 362.
105. Lagers, 491 So. 2d at 6 (quoting Pearce v. Pearce, 348 So. 2d 75, 77 (La. 1977)).
106. Allen, 648 So. 2d at 362 (emphasis added). The court cited Vicknair v. Vicknair, 237 La.
1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (La. 1959) and Pearce v. Pearce, 348 So. 2d 75 (La. 1977) to support this
proposition. id.
107. Adams v. Adams, 389 So. 2d 381, 383 (La. 1980). Adams involved an alimony proceeding
following a separation judgment which found that the defendant had abandoned the plaintiff. For a
complete discussion, see supra notes 56-60 and the accompanying text.
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courts will have to decide whether or not the alleged misconduct caused, or was a
cause of, the party's decision to end the marriage.
Whether the majority intended to change the causation test is unclear and the
ambiguity may lead to serious problems. The opinion did not discuss causation
thoroughly since it found no serious misconduct. Because the decision citedLagars
as the example for analysis of fault, one might reason that the court did preserve the
requirement of independent contributory or proximate cause. Interestingly, Justice
Kimball's concurrence specifically includes the definition, while the majority does
not. This suggests that Justice Kimball was concerned about the ambiguity and
wished to clarify that she favored a stronger causation requirement. Perhaps this
difference is evidence that the majority intended a different showing. Importantly,
however, the Allen court never reached the issue of causation because it found no
serious misconduct. Thus, arguably, any reference to causation, indeed even the
entire discussion of what is fault, is purely dictum.
D. The Burden of Proof Under Allen
The Allen decision did not address the burden ofproof, perhaps because neither
party raised the issue. Lagars held that if a spouse obtained a divorce on the basis
of adultery and then sought alimony, the defending spouse bore the burden of
proving the petitioning spouse was at fault.' The Lagars decision implies that
if the marriage is dissolved based on a fault ground,' 9 the spouse in whose favor
the divorce was granted need not bear the burden of proving freedom from fault in
an alimony proceeding. This standard applies for a divorce based on adultery and
also may apply for a divorce based on the commission of a felony as the only other
fault basis for divorce.
The Vicknair decision dealt with the burden of proof following a divorce
granted on the basis of time separate and apart." 0 In Vicknair, the court held that
the spouse petitioning for alimony bore the burden of proving herself free from
fault."' Since Allen did not specifically address the burden of proof, the court
probably left Lagars and Viclnair untouched as the law on the burden of proof.
E. Potential Misinterpretations of Allen v. Allen
1. Potentially Encourages Use of a Comparative Fault Method of
Analysis
The majority opinion in Allen cited many old cases which employed
different jurisprudential methods of analyzing fault in granting a separation
108. Lagars, 491 So. 2d at 5.
109. Now the only remaining fault grounds in the Civil Code are adultery or commission of a
felony with sentencing to hard labor or death. La. Civ. Code art. 103.
110. Vicknairv. Johnson, 237 La. 1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (La. 1959).
I11. Id. at 703.
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judgment. The Allen court used those cases to demonstrate the standard for
serious misconduct under Article 138. "'2 Yet, the majority neglected to limit
expressly its reliance on those cases to their showings of acts which constitute
misconduct."' While the conduct in those cases amounted to fault under
repealed Article 138, the cases also used comparative rectitude.
The court cited three early decisions that used a comparative fault approach,
Gormley v. Gormley,"4 McKoin v. McKoin,s and Abele v. Barker."6  An
initial reading of Gormley, Abele, or McKoin suggests, in determining fault, a
court should compare the conduct of each party to determine fault. These cases
balanced each spouse's acts and determined which spouse, if either, was more
blameworthy for the deterioration of the marriage. Although the facts of the
cases indicate that a party must be guilty of old Article 138-type conduct to be
found at fault, the method of analysis involved a balancing of each spouse's
conduct to find whether one spouse was more blameworthy than the other. By
relying on these early decisions without explaining that the cases were only
authoritative to show serious misconduct, the Allen decision may encourage
courts to employ a subjective, comparative analysis to determine fault in alimony
proceedings. While the opinion did rely on more recent cases, particularly
Lagars, the court also gave authoritative weight to other earlier decisions." 7
By citing early cases, the court confused its own analysis and failed to offer
lower courts a clear standard for determining serious misconduct.
2. Potentially Encourages Misinterpretations of the Standard for Serious
Misconduct
The majority opinion implicitly limited serious misconduct to that conduct
defined in old Articles 138 and 139. For its definition of legal fault, the court
quoted Brewer v. Brewer: "To be legally at fault, a spouse must be guilty of
cruel treatment or excesses which compel a separation because the marriage is
insupportable."" 8 The majority opinion, however, omitted the portion of the
Brewer decision holding that this language was synonymous with fault under old
Article 138." 9 While it is logical that the court intended to adopt the entire
Brewer definition of fault, its failure to explicitly restate that language may cause
112. See supra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. 161 La. 121, 108 So. 2d 307 (La. 1926).
115. 168 La. 32, 121 So. 182 (La. 1929).
116. 200 La. 125, 7 So. 2d 684 (La. 1942).
117. Particularly Abele, Gormley, and McKoin. For a complete discussion of the analysis in
these cases, see supra part II.B.I.
118. Brewer v. Brewer, 573 So. 2d 467, 469 (La. 1991) (citing Pearce v. Pearce, 348 So. 2d 75
(La. 1977); Vicknair v. Johnson, 237 La. 1032, 112 So. 2d 702 (1959)).
119. Brewer, 573 So. 2d at 469. (The court stated that to find Mrs. Brewer legally at fault for
nagging "would result in both a misapplication of Civil Code article 138 and an egregious
miscarriage of justice." Id.).
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confusion. Conduct less serious than that contemplated by Article 138 may be
used to bar alimony.
In addition, the court's ambiguous application of the repealed Article 138
standard may contribute to the confusion. For example, consider the majority's
discussion of Mrs. Allen's spending habits. Justice Watson, writing for the
majority, stated two reasons Mrs. Allen's spending did not amount to legal fault.
First, Mr. Allen knew of his wife's habits before he married her. Second, the
court determined that "[h]er expenditures ... d[id] not constitute profligacy for
the wife of a man with an annual income from $288,000 to $500,000.' 'I2° The
majority concluded that Mrs. Allen's spending habits did not amount to legal
fault. However, Justice Watson did not link the court's analysis of Mrs. Allen's
financial irresponsibility directly to the standard for judging cruelty developed
under Article 138. Nevertheless, one would reach the same finding of no legal
fault under Article 138 because Mrs. Allen's financial mismanagement did not
rise to the level of cruelty. Under Article 138, a spouse would be found at fault
for severe financial irresponsibility if the level of mismanagement amounted to
cruelty. Cruelty was an independent contributory or proximate cause of the
separation because it was grounds for separation under Article 138. The facts
would have to show that the mismanagement rose to the level of cruelty. If, for
example, the spouse's spending habits were so excessive that the family could
no longer afford the basic necessities of life, such conduct would be fault barring
alimony. The majority, however, did not clearly explain its analysis by
describing each step. Instead the court considered "her monetary irresponsibility
and bankruptcy" and said "[tihe evidence does not support this fault factor.' 2'
This omission may lead lower courts to make unreasoned or unprincipled
decisions based on subjective determinations. While the fact intensive analysis
requires some level of "gut reaction," the court's imprecise application of the
standard has the potential for abuse.
3. Potential Social Problems Resulting From Misinterpretation
These potential misinterpretations may lead to undesired effects. First, the
decision may increase the number of needy spouses who are refused alimony at
the trial level because courts may use a lesser standard of misconduct or a
comparative rectitude approach." Many unjustly denied spouses will not have
the resources to appeal such decisions. Also, if the able ex-spouse does not
support the petitioning spouse, the state will be left with the burden.2 3 Finally,
the decision's unclear standard may force divorcing spouses into extended
120. Allen v. Allen, 648 So. 2d 359, 363 (La. 1994).
121. Id. at 362-63.
122. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
123. McAlpine v. McAlpine, 650 So. 2d 1142 (La. 1995), withdrawn and reh g granted.
(Justice Dennis' opinion focused on the importance of alimony to protect the state from having to
support needy spouses.) See supra note 94.
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litigation at a time when they can least afford to do so. Family resources will
be spent litigating alimony decisions when the money would be better spent
supporting the family.
F. Suggestions for Practitioners
Practitioners should consider numerous cases establishing fault, including
early or overruled decisions on fault. In light of Allen, practitioners should be
prepared to argue for or against the application of the former Article 138
standard. A practitioner defending a claim for alimony may want to argue that
the standard is something less than the Article 138 standard if the petitioning
spouse's conduct is not of the level required in Vicknair and Kendrick.2 If
both spouses are guilty of serious misconduct as contemplated by that standard,
a practitioner might argue that his client is not the one most at blame and
contend that the comparative fault method should apply. Practitioners also will
have to argue or defend any possible grounds for fault, as courts may misinter-
pret Allen and find serious misconduct for less than old Article 138-type grounds.
Likewise, practitioners must anticipate courts applying either standard of
causation. Courts may require proof that the misconduct was either the legal,
proximate cause of the divorce or a showing that the conduct was the personal
reason the spouse sought divorce, as perhaps suggested in Allen. Practitioners
whose clients may be guilty of cruelty but seek alimony should argue that only
conduct which can cause a divorce can bar alimony. For clients in this position,
the argument that the jurisprudence required the serious misconduct to be "an
independent contributory or proximate cause of the separation" ''2 may succeed
since, without the doctrine of separation of bed and board, such Article 138
misconduct can no longer cause a divorce.
126
G. Suggestions to Courts Interpreting Allen
To follow the prior jurisprudence as the Allen decision ordered, courts must
resolve the causation issue. The prior jurisprudence requires that the only conduct
which bars alimony is conduct which would be grounds for separation or divorce,
and thus be the legal, proximate cause of the divorce. Today, such conduct would
only include adultery or commission of a felony with sentencing. A coutl
interpreting Allen might consider advancing such reasoning. Technically, the Allen
decision never reached the causation issue. Since Mrs. Allen's conduct did not
amount to cruelty, the court did not consider whether cruelty is a cause for divorce.
If courts choose to follow Allen's implicit suggestion that cause should no
longer be limited to legal cause for divorce, the standard for determining what is
124. See supra part II.B.2.
125. Kendrick v. Duconge, 236 La. 34, 106 So. 2d 707 (La. 1958).
126. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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serious misconduct should be the limited standard developed in the jurisprudence
which interpreted former Articles 138 and 139. The majority did name Lagars as
the primary case for determining fault, and Lagars used the standard of old Articles
138 and 139. Lagars established three essential considerations of fault. First, fault
must be "conduct or substantial acts of commission or omission by the wife
violative of her marital duties and responsibilities." Second, a "wife is not deprived
of alimony after divorce simply because she is not totally blameless in the marital
discord." Finally, "a wife's misconduct must also be an independent contributory
or proximate cause of the separation" to constitute fault.'27 The third consider-
ation necessarily limited fault to Article 138 and 139 conduct because only such
conduct could cause separation. Even if the court is willing to overlook the fact
that such conduct no longer will cause a divorce, the court should not change the
underlying standard for misconduct.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Allen court awarded alimony to Mrs. Allen, the opinion in Allen
will likely reduce the number of alimony awards in the future. That result goes
against the policy of preventing needy spouses from relying on state support, a
policy announced as recently as 1995 in McAlpine v. McAlpine. Thus, in
one sense, the decision breaks with the court's traditional policies of expanding
the opportunity for alimony awards. At the same time, the decision maintains
the policy of denying alimony to spouses guilty of serious misconduct, and such
a policy may be a good one. After all, the state may not wish to endorse a
policy which requires support for a spouse who committed the serious miscon-
duct enumerated in Article 138. The court chose to put this policy concern
before the former. However, the court stood on thin authority when resurrecting
Article 138 conduct as a bar to alimony. The jurisprudence upon which the
court relied defined fault which barred alimony as fault which would be the
legal, proximate cause of a separation or divorce. Article 138 conduct, other
than adultery or commission of a felony with sentencing, no longer can cause a
separation or divorce and therefore it no longer meets the definition of fault
which bars alimony under the prior jurisprudence. Perhaps the better solution
would have been to limit fault which bars alimony to adultery and commission
of a felony with sentencing, the two fault factors named in Article 103, and to
allow the legislature to reenact the definition of fault from repealed Article 138
if it so chose. This approach would follow the current codal scheme, the prior
jurisprudence, and the policy of limiting state support to needy spouses.
Miriam Wogan Henry
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